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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
THE NEW MARYLAND DEPOSITION AND
DISCOVERY PROCEDURE
By JAMES A. PIKE* and JOHN W. WILLISt
When its new Rules of Practice and Procedure went
into effect on September 1, 1941, Maryland joined the select
list of states enjoying the benefits of the most liberal and
flexible discovery system in operation anywhere. Like the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which entered their
fourth year of service on September 16, the Maryland rules
have incorporated the various devices for discovery which
have proved most useful and effective in actual operation
in the jurisdictions of this country and England.1 By ad-
hering fairly closely to the wording of the Federal Rules
wherever possible, the draftsmen of the Maryland provi-
sions have preserved for practitioners in the state the bene-
fits of the interpretations already placed on the Federal
Rules by the cases construing them. At the same time
they have taken the opportunity to avoid some of the de-
fects which have been revealed in the practical operation
of the Rules.'
The Federal discovery rules themselves have elsewhere
been treated by the present writers.2 What we have
already said will not be repeated here except insofar as it
is relevant to the present discussion. In addition, the his-
torical background of the new Maryland procedure and the
general considerations in favor of the adoption of a lib-
eralized discovery practice have already been given an
excellent discussion by Mr. Robert R. Bowie, Reporter to
the Advisory Committee which drafted the rules, in the
* A.B., 1934, LL.B., 1936, University of Southern California; J.S.D., 1938,
Yale Law School; Attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission; Lec-
turer in Civil Procedure, George Washington University Law School;
Co-editor, Federal Rules Service.
t A.B., 1934, University of California at Los Angles; LL.B., 1937, Uni-
versity of Southern California; Member of the California Bar; Managing
Editor, Federal Rules Service.
"A comparative table showing the correlation between the Maryland
Rules and the Federal Rules will be found at the end of this article.
2Pike and Willis, The New Federal Depo8ition-Discovery Procedure
(1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1179, 1436; Federal Discovery in Operation (1940)
7 U. Chi. L. Rev. 297. See also Pike, The New Federal Deposition-Dis-
eovery Procedure and the RMie8 of Evidence (1939) 34 Ill. L. Rev. 1.
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Notes to the Rules.8 It will be the purpose of this article
to discuss some of the more practical questions arising
in the day-to-day use of the new procedure. The real
meat of any discussion of discovery procedure is of course
the scope of discovery-what information can be obtained.
In order to put this question in its proper perspective, how-
ever, it will be necessary first to discuss the general ob-
jectives of the new procedure and its actual working.
I. GENERAL PURPOSES OF THE NEW PROCEDURE
Essentially, the object of any discovery procedure4 is to
enable each party to get at the facts before trial. This
serves at least three important purposes. First, it aids in
the disposition of groundless claims and meritless defenses,
and promotes settlements. When the parties are required
to "lay their cards on the table" they are much more likely
to be able to get together on settlement than if their evi-
dence is kept up their sleeves. Secondly, it makes pos-
sible a more intelligent and efficient preparation for trial
through the elimination of surprise and guesswork.
Finally, it expedites the disposition of cases which are
brought to trial by clarifying the issues, eliminating non-
controversial matters and simplifying proof.5
In the Federal courts the new discovery procedure
works hand in hand with several other devices. In the
first place, pleadings have been greatly simplified, objec-
tions thereto minimized, and the burden of issue-formula-
tion and fact-revelation thrown onto discovery.6 Also, the
pre-trial conference assists in the formulation of issues
3 General Rules of Practice and Procedure Adopted by the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland, with Explanatory Notes, printed and distributed by
Maryland State Bar Association, Bar Association of Baltimore City and
Junior Bar Association of Baltimore City, 1941. References hereafter to
the Notes to the Rules will be to this pamphlet.
' As used in this article the term "discovery" includes discovery by depo-
sition, as well as by the other methods traditionally classified under that
title.
I See generally Pike and Willis, supra, n. 1; Notes to Maryland Rules, 37.
'Pike, Some Current Trends in the Construction of the Federal Rules
(1940) 9 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 26, 27-8; Pike, Objections to Pleadings Under
the Federal Rules (1937) 47 Yale L. J. 50.
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and in promoting settlements.7  Finally, the summary
judgment is closely tied in with discovery, since judgment
may be rendered on the basis of admissions made by the
opposing party in depositions or answers to interrogatories
or requests to admit.8 None of these procedural reforms
has yet been adopted in Maryland. It is to be hoped that,
if the new discovery rules prove a success, they will be
implemented in the future by the pre-trial conference and
the summary judgment, and the burden taken off pleading
which can better be borne by discovery.
II. THE MECHANICS OF DiscovERY
Several methods of discovery are provided in the new
Rules. None of them, with the exception of the request
for admission of facts or documents, is a novelty to Mary-
land lawyers, but all have been greatly expanded in scope
and effectiveness. Probably the most important is the
deposition (Deposition Rules 1-12; Discovery Rules 1, 3).
As an alternative or supplement to the deposition the old
method of serving interrogatories on the adverse party is
preserved (Discovery Rules 2, 3). The order for produc-
tion of documents and other property has been expanded
(Discovery Rule 4). Discovery Rule 5 codifies existing
Maryland practice relevant to mental and physical exam-
ination of parties. Finally, there is provided that very
handy device, the request for admissions (Discovery
Rule 6).
The different provisions for discovery are designed to
be used as supplements to each other, rather than as ex-
clusive methods. So a party may by deposition or inter-
rogatory ascertain the existence of relevant documents
and then serve a request for their production;9 or he may
supplement depositions or interrogatories with a request
7 See Laws, Pre-Trial Procedure in the District of Columbia (1939) 25
Am. Bar Assn. J. 855; Laws and Stockman, Pre-Trial Conferences, Jud.
Admin. Monographs, Series A, No. 4 (A. B. A. 1941).
8 See Clark, Summary Judgments, Jud. Admin. Monographs, Series A,
No. 5 (A. B. A. 1941).
9Gaumond v. Spector Motor Service, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 364 (D. Mass.,
1940) ; Brockway Glass Co., Inc., v. Hartford-Empire Co., 36 F. Supp. 470
(W. D. N. Y., 1941); Moinester v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 1 F. R. D. 247 (S. D.
N. Y., 1940).
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to admit.10 Of course, to prevent oppression, the court can
call a halt to going over the same ground by different
methods, such as by serving interrogatories after the taking
of a deposition of the same person," or covering the same
ground on the taking of a deposition as was covered by
interrogatories previously served.12 But this discretion
should certainly be exercised with caution and only to
prevent useless duplication.
1. Depositions.
In its original conception the deposition was not re-
garded as a method of discovery, but as a means of pre-
serving testimony against the possible death or disability
of the witness. Accordingly, restrictions were placed upon
the taking of depositions designed to limit their availa-
bility to cases where some showing was made that the
deponent would probably be unavailable at the trial
through absence from the jurisdiction or illness or death.
Eventually, however, it was realized that the deposition
was also a practical method of discovery before trial, pos-
sessing many advantages over the old bill of discovery
or interrogatories. In many states therefore the restric-
tions on the taking of depositions have been relaxed and
retained only as limitations on use.'8
The previous Maryland law on this subject was not at
all clear. The code provisions were ambiguous, 4 but they
had apparently not been construed in any reported deci-
sion, although one trial court judge had held that the lim-
itations on use were also limitations on taking. 1 What-
2
0 Nekrasoff v. U. S. Rubber Co., 27 F. Supp. 953 (S. D. N. Y., 1939)
(depositions) ; Modern Food Process Co., Inc., v. Chester Packing & Provi-
sion Co., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 520 (E. D. Pa., 1939) ("In framing its requests
the plaintiff apparently dissected the defendant's answers to its interroga-
tories and drew a specific request directed to each separate fact contained
in them, adding several new requests ...").
11McNally v. Simons, 1 F. R. D. 254 (S. D. N. Y., 1940), per Hulbert,
D. J.
" Howard v. States Marine Corp., 1 F. R. D. 499 (S. D. N. Y., 1940), per
Hulbert, D. J.
13 Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure
(1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1179, 1186-8.
" Md. Code (1939) Art. 35, Secs. 21, 22, 23, 26, 29, 34; Art. 16, Sec. 282
(Equity Rule 35).
'
5 Danzer v. Western Md. Ry., Baltimore Court of Common Pleas, 1932,
cited in Notes to Maryland Rules, 49, n. 24.
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ever the old law, however, there is no ambiguity in the
new Rules. The deposition of any witness may be taken,
whether a party or not, without any showing of probable
unavailability; but restrictions are placed on the use of the
deposition at the trial.16
In their provisions for taking of depositions, without
leave of court, "at any time after jurisdiction has been
obtained over any defendant or over property which is
the subject of the proceeding", the Maryland Rules are
more liberal than the Federal Rules. The first draft of
Federal Rule 26 contained a similar provision; 17 but the
rule as adopted requires leave of court for the taking of
depositions before an answer is filed.' The reason for the
limitation apparently was a fear that to permit unre-
stricted taking of depositions before joinder of issue would
permit too wide a range of inquiry and possible oppression.
The permissible scope of examination under the rules is so
broad, however, that it may be doubted whether a require-
ment that issue be joined would materially limit it. At
any rate the Maryland rules make no such requirement."
As a matter of practice, however, most lawyers will prob-
ably wait until issue is joined before resorting to the taking
of depositions, unless the information sought is needed for
the drafting of an answer.
Whether the deposition must be transcribed is a ques-
tion which has given rise to some discussion in the Fed-
eral practice. If the deposition is taken merely for dis-
covery the party may obtain all the information he wishes
by the oral examination and may not wish to go to the
added expense of obtaining a transcript. Furthermore,
he may not be able to pay the cost of transcribing. The
Federal Rules are not clear on the point, but one court
has held that a plaintiff who has taken defendant's deposi-
"ODeposition Rules 1, 11.
17Preliminary Draft (May, 1936) Rule 31(a).
"Rule 26(a).
"Colorado similarly rejected the limitation In adopting the Federal rule.
Colo. R. C. P. (1941) Rule 26(a). See note to Rule 26(a) (Second Draft,
1940) : "This [requirement of leave] was thought bad practice and unnec-
essary hardship on lawyers in counties other than that In which the action
Is pending."
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tion may not be compelled by defendant to have the deposi-
tion transcribed and filed unless defendant advances the
costs. 20 The Maryland rules have wisely obviated any
difficulty on this score by providing that the deposition
shall be transcribed unless the parties agree otherwise or
the court "upon motion and for good cause shown, orders
otherwise to save expense, or to prevent hardship or in-
justice".21
The actual procedure for taking of depositions is simple
enough. Where the deposition is to be taken on oral ex-
amination, the taker serves a notice on "every other party",
at least five days prior to the date of examination (Deposi-
tion Rule 5). The notice must state the time and place of
the examination, the name or title of the officer before
whom it is to be taken,22 and the name and address of the
deponent "or, if the name is not known, a general descrip-
tion sufficient to identify him or the particular class or
group to which he belongs".28 The notice should not par-
ticularize the subject matter of the examination. 24  No
subpoena is required to enforce attendance of a party,25
20 Odum v. Willard Stores, Inc., 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 30c.4, Case 1, 69
Wash. L. Rep. 466 (D. C. 1941). See Koenigsberger, Suggestions for
Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1941) 4 Fed. Rules Serv.
1010, 1012-13.
2 Deposition Rule 8(c).
"The Federal Rule (30[a]) does not make this requirement.
Deposition Rule 3 specifies the persons before whom a deposition may
be taken.
23 All of the cases on this point have been decided In the Eastern and
Southern Districts of New York. The Eastern District has applied a more
liberal rule. Compare Burris v. American Chicle Co., 1 F. R. D. 9 (E. D.
N. Y., 1939) ("superintendent or caretaker in charge of the premises"
held sufficient) and Stern v. Exposition Greyhound, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 696
(E. D. N. Y., 1941) (". . . such other of defendant's officers, agents, serv-
ants, employees and representatives having knowledge thereof... " held
sufficient) with Orange County Theatres, Inc., v. Levy, 26 F. Supp. 416
(S. D. N. Y., 1938) ; Freeman v. Hotel Waldorf-Astoria Corp., 27 F. Supp.
303 (S. D. N. Y., 1939); Cohen v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 30 F. Supp. 419
(S. D. N. Y., 1939) ; Spaeth v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 4 Fed. Rules
Serv. 30a.22, Case 2 (S. D. N. Y., 1941).
24 Freeman v. Hotel Waldorf-Astoria Corp., 27 F. Supp. 303 (S. D. N. Y.,
1939); Saviolis v. National Bank of Greece, 25 F. Supp. 966 (S. D. N. Y.,
1939); Bennett v. The Westover, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 10 (S. D. N. Y., 1938);
Spaeth v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 30a.22, Case 2
(S. D. N. Y., 1941).
25 Whitaker v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 1 Fed. Rules Serv. 45c.33,
Case 1 (S. D. N. Y., 1939); French v. Zalstem-Zalesky, 1 F. R.. D. 240
(S. D. N. Y., 1940); Havell v. Time, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 439 (S. D. N. Y.,
1940).
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as distinguished from a witness.28 Other parties may ex-
amine or cross-examine the deponent as at the trial, or
may submit written interrogatories. If the deposition is
to be taken entirely on written interrogatories, the inter-
rogatories are served on every other party with a notice
stating the name and address of the deponent and the
name or title and address of the officer. Cross, redirect
and recross interrogatories may be served. The officer pro-
pounds the questions to the witness. Under either system
the deposition is transcribed, subject to the qualification
mentioned above, read to or by the witness, and signed
by him, unless signature is waived or the witness is "ill
or cannot be found or refuses to sign". The officer certifies
the deposition and files it and the party taking it gives
notice of filing to all other parties. Elaborate provisions
are made for waiver of objections unless made at the
earliest opportunity.
Some Federal courts have held that an examination
should not be conducted in the office of the attorney for
the examining party." The reason for this holding, how-
ever, is not apparent, and it would seem to work a hardship
on attorneys in smaller cases. These decisions should not
be followed in the state practice.
Where both parties serve notices to take the deposition
of the other the first to serve his notice will ordinarily be
granted the opportunity to conduct his examination first,28
even though his opponent specifies an earlier date.29 Of
course, on some special showing the court could grant one
or the other party priority regardless of the sequence of
service.8 0
2. Interrogatories to parties.
In their provisions for interrogatories to parties the
Maryland Rules are probably an improvement over the
"6 See Deposition Rule 7 as to subpoenas generally.7 Norton v. Cooper, Jarrett, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 92 (N. D. N. Y., 1938);
Havell v. Time, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 439 (S. D. N. Y., 1940).
"8 Grauer v. Schenley Products Co., Inc., 26 F. Supp. 768 (S. D. N. Y.,
1938); Bough v. Lee, 28 F. Supp. 673 (S. D. N. Y., 1939).
11 Shamokin Woolen Mills, Inc-, v. Cortille ]Fabrics, Inc., 4 Fed. Rules
Serv. 30b.33, Case 1 (S. D. N. Y., 1941).
See Kenealy v. Texas Co., 29 F. Supp. 502 (S. D. N. Y., 1939).
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Federal Rules. Federal Rule 33 is unnecessarily silent on
a number of points, which are being cleared up only by
a slow process of interpretation by the courts. The Mary-
land Rule (Discovery Rule 2) is a good deal more explicit.
Interrogatories to parties are of course not new in
Maryland practice, having been brought down from the
old equity procedure3 1 and also made available in law
actions.32 The narrow scope of examination hitherto avail-
able, however, has discouraged their use.33 With the lib-
eralization of the scope of inquiry, interrogatories should
be a useful tool in preparation for trial. They are of course
inexpensive, and, where the facts are simple, furnish a
fairly effective method of obtaining admissions from the
adverse party. In more complicated factual situations, or
where the facts are highly controversial, the interrogatory
is not as suitable a method as the deposition. Evasive re-
plies are much easier where the questions are presented in
advance with opportunity to give careful consideration to
the framing of answers than on oral examination where
answers must be given spontaneously. Again, use of the
interrogatory method in complicated and controversial
situations increases the burden on the courts through
multiplying objections to interrogatories or motions for
more definite answers.3 4 The Federal Courts, taking their
lead from an opinion of District Judge Chesnut of the Dis-
trict of Maryland, have accordingly held in a number of
cases that interrogatories should be relatively few and
concerned with important aspects of the case, and have
ordered the parties to resort rather to the taking of deposi-
tions where the interrogatories were too numerous and
complicated. 5
11 Equity Rules 25 and 26, Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Secs. 186, 187.
8Md. Code (1939) Art. 75, Sec. 106.
8 Notes to Maryland Rules, 52-3. For discussion of the scope of ex-
amination under the new rules, see infra, circa notes 70 et 8eq.
8, See Notes to Maryland Rules, 53; Sunderland, Scope and Method of
Discovery before Trial (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 863, 875-6.
8 Coca Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Laboratories, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 275 (D. Md.,
1939) ; New England Terminal Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 3 Fed. Rules
Serv. 33.352, Case 1 (D. R. I., 1940); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. James B.
Berry Sons Co., 1 F. R. D. 163 (W. D. Pa., 1940) ; Byers Theaters, Inc., v.
Murphy, 1 F. R. D. 286 (W. D. Va., 1940); Chemical Foundation, Inc., v.
Universal-Cyclops Steel Corp., 1 F. R. D. 533 (W. D. Pa., 1941).
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This restriction has been codified in the Maryland rule,
which provides that no party may, without leave of court,
serve on the same party more than thirty interrogatories
"including interrogatories subsidiary or incidental to, or
dependent upon other interrogatories, however grouped,
combined or arranged". Leave of court presumably will
be granted only on a showing that to require the taking of
depositions would work a hardship on the examining party.
Similar to the Federal rule is- the provision that not more
than one set of interrogatories may be served on the same
party without leave of court. 6
Under Federal Rule 33 the party served with interroga-
tories should either answer or object to the court, and if he
simply fails to answer the propounding party must go to
court under Rule 37 for an order compelling the party to
answer or for an order striking the party's pleadings or
dismissing the action or entering a default judgment. One
Federal court has accordingly held that a motion to compel
answer to interrogatories is improper;87 another, however,
has entertained such a motion without comment.8 8 The
Federal rules say nothing as to the proper procedure where
the party answers but the answer is objected to as incom-
plete or evasive. It would seem a distortion of meaning
to regard such an answer as a refusal to answer. Some
courts have held that motion for a more adequate answer
is in order in such a case, and this is expressly provided for
in the local rules of a number of district courts.3 9
The Maryland rule has avoided any question as to the
proper procedure in such cases by providing that the party
86 See supra, notes 11, 12.
87 United States for benefit of General Electric Supply Corp. v. W. E.
O'Neil Constr. Co., 1 F. R. D. 529 (D. Mass., 1941).
89 Chemical Foundation, Inc., v. Universal-Cyclops Steel Corp., 1 F. R. D.
533 (W. D. Pa., 1941).
89 Gaumond v. Spector Motor Service, Inc., 3 Fed. Rules Nerv. 33.421,
Case 1 (D. Mass., 1940); Steingut v. National City Bank, 4 Fed. Rules
Serv. 33.421, Case 1 (S. D. N. Y., 1940); American Lecithin Co. v. W. A.
Cleary Corp., 1 F. R. D. 603 (D. N. J., 1941) ; E. D. N. Y. Civil Rule 14;
S. D. N. Y. Civil Rule 14; N. D. N. Y. Civil Rule 13; N C. Rule 12 (all
districts). In Crosley Radio Corp. v. Hleb, 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 33.422,
Case 1 (S. D. Iowa, July 22, 1941), it was held that the giving of false
or evasive answers might be punished as a contempt and the party re-
quired to reimburse his opponent for additional expenses occasioned
thereby.
[VOL. VI
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY
submitting the interrogatories may file exceptions to the
sufficiency of any answer or refusal to answer, and that
the court may order an answer or further answer and
may penalize an inadequate answer or refusal to answer
by requiring the recalcitrant party to pay the expenses of
obtaining the order, including attorney's fees.40 No provi-
sion is made for objection by the party served; the burden
is put on the interrogating party to bring the matter
before the court. The Maryland system seems a more
reasonable one, since if the interrogated party refuses to
answer his opponent may well decide to throw over the
interrogatories altogether and resort to the taking of depo-
sitions, and the court is spared the labor of passing on the
question.
Another matter in which the Maryland rule represents
an improvement 'over the Federal model is the use of an-
swers to interrogatories as evidence. The Federal rule is
silent on the question, although it would seem obvious that
the answers would be admissible for the interrogating
party as admissions of the adverse party, but that the
latter might not introduce his own answers since they
would be merely self-serving statements."1 The Maryland
rule makes this clear by providing that answers, "so far
as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used as
evidence against" the answering party by the party sub-
mitting the interrogatories. A salutary addition is the re-
quirement, also taken from the Federal Rule on deposi-
tions, 2 that "If only a part of the party's answers is of-
fered in evidence, he may require the, introduction of all
the answers which are relevant to the part introduced".
3. Discovery of documents and property.
Except for a broadening of the scope of discovery-a
subject hereafter to be discussed-the new Discovery Rule
4 has made no substantial change in the Maryland law as
40 Discovery Rule 2(c).
1 See Commentary, Use of Answers to Interrogatories under Rule 83 as
Evidence, 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 33.46; Bailey v. New England Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 1 F. R. D. 494 (S. D. Cal., 1940).
,2 Rule 26(d). See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1 Fed.
Rules Serv. 26d.52, Case 1 (S. D. N. Y., 1939).
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to discovery of documents and other tangible things.43 The
rule is limited to documents, etc., in the possession or
under the control of a party to the action, and the remedy
is available at any time in the proceeding.
4. Mental and physical examination.
Discovery Rule 5, while patterned in part on Federal
Rule 35, merely codifies existing non-statutory practice
in Maryland.44 No question of its validity is therefore
likely to be raised.45 It may be pointed out that the rule
permits the court to order an examination "whenever the
mental or physical condition of a party is material to any
matter involved in any proceeding". In this it goes farther
than some state statutes allowing the remedy only in per-
sonal-injury cases.4" While it is probable that the rule
will find its greatest use in such cases, there would seem
to be no reason so to limit it, and neither the Federal nor
the Maryland rules does so.
5. Admission of facts and of genuineness of documents.
One of the handiest of the new discovery devices is the
request for admissions, brought into Maryland practice
in Discovery Rule 6. The rule follows fairly closely the
language. of Federal Rule 36, which in turn is based on
the English Rule and on rules or statutes of Massachusetts,
Illinois, New York and certain other states.47
The request for admissions is just what its name im-
plies-not so much a method of discovering facts but
of getting the adverse party to admit the truth of par-
ticular, relevant fact-items or of the genuineness of docu-
ments, in order to save time and expense at the trial. A
proper form for the request is as follows:
"3 See Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, See. 27; Art. 75, Sees. 104, 106.
44 See Notes to Maryland Rules, 54-5.
" Cf. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1 (1941) (Rule 35).
'"B. g., N. Y. C. P. A. (1941) Sec. 306. But cf. Wadlow v. Humberd,
27 F. Supp. 210 (W. D. Mo., 1939), criticized in Pike and Willis, Federal
Discovery in Operation (1940) 7 U. Chi. L. Rev. 297, 324-6; Note (1939)
34 Il1. L. Rev. 103.
'7 See Eng. Sup. Ct., 0. 32; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937) Ch. 110, See. 182, and
Rule 18, See. 259.18; 2 Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) Ch. 231, Sec. 69; Mich.
Court Rules (1933) Rule 42; N. J. Stat. Ann. (1939) See. 2.27-161; N. Y.
C. P. A. (1941) Sec. 322; Wis. Stat. (1939) Sec. 327.22.
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Plaintiff A. B. requests defendant C. D. within 10
days" after service of this request, to make the fol-
lowing admissions for the purpose of this action only
and subject to all pertinent objections to admissibility
which may be interposed at the trial:
1. That each of the following documents, exhibited
with this request, is genuine.
(Here list the documents and describe each
document.)
2. That each of the following statements is true.
(Here list the statements.)
S ig n ed : ...............................................................
Attorney for plaintiff.
Copies of the documents, if any, must be delivered with
the request unless copies have already been furnished. If
the facts are stated in documents the request should spe-
cify the particular relevant facts concerning which an
admission is sought.49 If the party served fails within the
period designated in the request to serve a sworn state-
ment either. denying specifically or "setting forth in detail
the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny"
the matters, they are deemed admitted, for the purposes of
the pending proceeding only. If the party "refuses the ad-
mission''50 and his opponent thereafter proves the facts
the court may require the recalcitrant party to pay the
reasonable expenses of making such proof unless there
were good reasons for the refusal or the admissions were
of "no substantial importance".
The Maryland rule has remedied one of the defects of
the Federal rule. Under the latter rule there has been con-
siderable confusion as to whether a party served with a
request may attack it by any preliminary motion or
whether, if he does not want to answer it, he must simply
refuse to admit and take his chance of being assessed for
d" The rule requires that the notice designate a period, not less than ten
days.
" Kraus v. General Motors Co., 29 F. Supp. 430 (S. D. N. Y., 1939).
50 This is the language of Discovery Rule 6. Federal Rule 37(c), other-
wise sirmilar, applies only where there is a "sworn denial".
1941]
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costs later on. One or two courts have entertained motions
to strike or limit a request to admit,5' but the majority
have held that no such motion may be made.5" Again, one
court has assumed the propriety of a preliminary motion
with matters contained in a request be "deemed admitted"
through failure to respond to the request,53 but another
court has held improper a motion to strike an answer or to
compel a more definite answer.5 4
The Maryland rule has obviated these difficulties by
providing that "Objections to a request to admit or to a
refusal to admit shall be heard only on the application to
assess expenses . . ."" The limitation is a wise one. The
rule is intended to operate extrajudicially, as a method of
expediting litigation; but if every request to admit were
to be subject to a motion to strike or limit, and every re-
fusal to admit to a motion to compel answer, the wheels
of litigation would be clogged.56 The proper manner to
raise any objection to a request to admit is by refusal to
admit. Federal courts have held that even though the rule
requires a party to admit or deny or state "the reasons
why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny", a party
may refuse to admit on the ground that the matters re-
quested to be admitted are irrelevant or privileged.57 Al-
though this construction seems to do some violence to the
language just quoted, it seems the only proper one under
51 Booth Fisheries Co. v. General Foods Co., 27 F. Supp. 268 (D. Del.,
1939); Treasure Imports v. Henry Amdur & Sons, 1 Fed. Rules Serv.
36a.22, Case 2 (S. D. N. Y., 1939).
52 Nekrasoff v. United States Rubber Co., 27 F. Supp. 953 (S. D. N. Y.,
1939) ; Modern Food Process Co. v. Chester Packing & Provision Co., 30
F. Supp. 520 (E. D. Pa., 1939); Unlandherm v. Park Contracting Co., 1
F. R. D. 122 (S. D. N. Y., 1940); Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Payne,
1 F. R. D. 118 (S. D. N. Y., 1940). Accord: Banca Nazionale di Credito
v. Equitable Trust Co., 221 App. Div. 555, 224 N. Y. 617 (1927) ; Crawford
v. Chorley, 18 Weekly Notes, pt. 1, at 198 (Eng. 1883).
"' Kraus v. General Motors Co., 29 F. Supp. 430 (S. D. N. Y., 1939).
5' Momand v. Paramount Pictures Distributing Co., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 568
(D. Mass., 1941).
5 Discovery Rule 6(d) (last sentence).
56 Commentary, Method o1 Attacking Notice to Admit Facts, 1 Fed. Rules
Serv. 36a.41 (1939) ; 2 MooRE, FEDELRA PRAcTIcE (1938) 2660-2661; Jenner
and Schaefer, The Proposed Illinois Civil Practice Act (1933) 1 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 49, 57.
57 Modern Food Process Co. v. Chester Packing & Provision Co., 30 F.
Supp. 520 (E. D. Pa., 1939) ; Momand v. Paramount Pictures Distributing
Co., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 568 (D. Mass., 1941).
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the Maryland rule, since otherwise the party would have
no way to raise the objection-unless by failing entirely to
answer, which would seem unnecessarily risky.
The Maryland rule incorporates a clause found in the
English rule and in some state statutes," although not in
the Federal rule, to the effect that the court may to pre-
vent injustice allow a party to withdraw an admission or
relieve a party from an implied admission.
The request to admit is to some extent an alternative
to interrogatories to parties, but it is more expedient and
efficient than the latter remedy, inasmuch as it is not sub-
ject to attack before trial. In view of the limitation of the
number of interrogatories under the Maryland rule,59 the
request to admit should find even more use than it has in
Federal practice.
6. Sanctions.
The Maryland rules, like the Federal rules, provide a
diversified arsenal of sanctions for enforcement of the vari-
ous discovery rules. If a party refuses to be sworn on the
taking of a deposition, or refuses to answer after being
ordered to by the court, or refuses to obey an order to
produce documents or other things or to submit to a phys-
ical or mental examination, the court may enter an order
dispensing with proof of the particular facts, or precluding
the party from introducing proof on particular matters, or
striking the pleadings, or staying proceedings, or dismiss-
ing the proceeding or rendering a default judgment; or
the party may be held in contempt, except for disobedi-
ence of an order to submit to mental or physical examina-
tion.6 0 Failure to answer interrogatories is ground for dis-
missal or default or striking of pleadings.61 The sanctions
for the enforcement of the rule on admission of facts have
just been discussed.
58 Eng. Sup. Ct., 0. 32, r. 4; Il. Sup. Ct., Rule 18(2) ; Mich. Ct. Rule 42,
Sec. 2; N. Y. C. P. A. (1939) Sec. 323.
"9 See text supra, circa n. 34.
00 Deposition Rules 8(d), 12; Discovery Rule 7.
6' Discovery Rule 2(d).
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Federal courts at first were hesitant about invoking
the drastic penalties provided by the rules.2 The pro-
cedure was new and in most cases the party's failure to
comply was due to unfamiliarity with the rules. Recently,
however, the courts have enforced the sanctions with more
strictness. In one case the intention of defendant, a vital
issue, could be shown only by certain records in defend-
ant's possession. When defendant failed to comply with
an order for their production, the court held that plaintiff
was entitled to judgment or to a finding that defendait's
intention was as plaintiff alleged. 3 In another case, where
plaintiff refused to answer interrogatories on a particular
issue, the court precluded her from introducing proof
on that issue even though her right to recovery depended
on it.64 In Roerich v. Esquire Coronet, Inc.,6 5 plaintiff, a
resident of India, twice obtained stipulations for an exten-
sion of time within which he might be produced for ex-
amination before trial, but then indicated that he did not
intend to come to the United States at any time in the
near future. The action was dismissed for want of prose-
cution.
7. Remedies.
The rules, of course, are intended to do justice to both
sides, and just as the discoveror may invoke sanctions to
enforce discovery, so the discoveree may apply to the court
for relief against oppressive application of the rules. Depo-
sition Rule 6 (a), patterned after Federal Rule 30 (b), gives
the court a wide discretion to limit or modify the scope
and manner of taking depositions. The court may forbid
the taking of the deposition, or order it to be taken in a
different place or before a different officer, or privately, or
order that it be taken only on written interrogatories or
only on oral examination, or require the deposition to be
11B. g., Dann v. Compagnie G~n~rale Trans-Atlantique, 29 F. Supp. 330
(E. D. N. Y., 1939) ; Madison v. Cobb, 29 F. Supp. 881 (M. D. Pa., 1939).
11 Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co. v. Strauss & Co., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 229
(D. Ore., 1940).
61 Fisher v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 115 F. (2d) 641 (C. C. A.
7th, 1940). This would seem proper only if the court had ordered the
party to answer. See Federal Rule 37(d) (2) (1i).
0 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 37d.31, Case 1 (S. D. N. Y., 1941).
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sealed, or order the parties to exchange information in
sealed envelopes, or limit the scope of the examination.6
The rule applies only to depositions, but the other dis-
covery methods (except the request to admit) are in the
control of the court anyway, and the court presumably
has just as wide a range of discretion.
The Federal cases furnish a number of interesting ex-
amples of the type of protective orders which may be made.
One court has held that a defendant wintering in the
Bahama Islands might be required to pay costs of plain-
tiff's attorney in going there to take her depositions, if
she did not choose to return to New York in time for the
examination.6 7 In another case depositions were to be
taken in Italy and the court ordered that if the adverse
party could not afford to be represented at the taking, he
could submit written interrogatories after inspecting the
transcript of the testimony.68 In a converse situation a
party was given leave to conduct oral cross-examination of
witnesses in China whose depositions were to be taken on
written interrogatories. 9
III. SCOPE OF EXAMINATION
Under the old practice discovery was hedged about
with restrictions and limitations. A party might not in-
quire into his opponent's case; he could not inquire into
matters within his own knowledge; he could not inquire as
to the names of witnesses. In addition there were restric-
tions designed to apply to discovery before trial the rules
of evidence applicable to testimony in open court.7 0
To some extent these limitations were more or less acci-
dental. Most of them, however, fitted in with what Dean
Wigmore has termed the "sporting theory" of justice--the
" As to limitation of the scope of examination, see infra, circa n. 70
et seq.
67 Heiberg v. Hasler, 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 30b.41, Case 1 (S. D. N. Y.,
.1941).
68 The Italia, 28 F. Supp. 309 (E. D. N. Y., 1939).
69 Winograd Bros. v. Chase Nat. Bank, 1 Fed. Rules Serv. 31d.23, Case 1
(S. D. N. Y., 1939).
71 See generally Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery
Procedure (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1436 et seq.; Notes to Maryland Rules,
40-41, 45-8; RAGLAND, DiscovEnR BEFORE TuTAL (1932) pa8sim.
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idea that each party was entitled to keep as secret as pos-
sible the evidence supporting his claim or defense. This
idea, while it may have made litigation more adventure-
some, certainly did little to expedite it or to insure the
doing of justice. And the law has gradually worked away
from the old limitations until in certain of the states and
the new Federal rules they have been almost entirely cast
aside. The Maryland rules have adopted this more liberal
attitude.
1. Inquiry into other party's case.
Most drastic of the old limitations was the prohibition
against inquiry into the other party's case-i. e., matters on
which the latter party had the burden of proof. Thus while
a plaintiff might interrogate the defendant as to facts re-
lating to plaintiff's case in chief, he could not inquire into
matters of defense; and likewise the defendant could not
examine the plaintiff as to the details of plaintiff's case.71
In jurisdictions employing the combined deposition-dis-
covery procedure this restriction has generally disap-
peared-because the scope of examination permitted in
depositions taken for discovery was as wide as in the case
of depositions taken primarily for the purpose of obtaining
evidence for the trial.72 The new Maryland rules, how-
ever, deliberately make it clear that the old restriction is
abandoned. In language similar to that of Federal Rule
26(b), Discovery Rule 3 (applicable both to depositions
and to interrogatories) provides that the party or witness
may be examined regarding any relevant and non-privi-
leged matter "whether relating to the claim or defense of
the party examining or submitting interrogatories or to
the claim or defense of any other party". And Discovery
Rule 4 permits discovery of documents and other property
"which may constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the proceeding".
It has of course often been objected that to allow a
party to "pry into" his opponent's case before trial will
1 See n. 70, supra.
72Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Diacovery Procedure
(1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1436, 1440.
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lead to perjury and the subornation of perjury. This argu-
ment, however, has been pretty well exploded by such
authorities as Professor Sunderland73 and Mr. Ragland. 4
On the basis of the state experience it is pointed out that,
rather than encouraging perjury, a liberal discovery pro-
cedure actually discourages it by permitting each party to
tie his opponent down to a definite position early in the
game. The mutuality of the remedy is its protection, for,
while a party may be forced to reveal his case to his oppo-
nent, at the same time he can compel his opponent to state
his position; the court can even require the parties simul-
taneously to exchange information in sealed envelopes.75
In any event, no complaint of "perjury" seems to have
been made since the adoption of the Federal rules, and
they have been given daily application in every type of
case.
The Federal courts, applying the provisions of the Fed-
eral rules, were quick to realize that the old shackles had
been struck off. In one of the first cases under the new
procedure, Judge Moscowitz said that "it will not avail a
party to raise the familiar cry of 'fishing expedition' .76
And other decisions have likewise sustained such inquiry
into the other party's case.77 In a particularly interesting
holding, Judge Nields of the District of Delaware has per-
mitted a defendant, in an action by the government, to
recover taxes for illegal diversion of alcohol, to inquire
by interrogatories into the evidence upon which the gov-
78 Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery before Trial (1933) 42
Yale L. J. 863, 867. See also Clark, The Proposed New Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 447, 450.
7' RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932) 124-5.
7 Discovery Rule 6(a) (9), taken from Federal Rule 30(b). Cf. Bab-
cock & Wilcox Co. v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 25 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del.,
1938); Teller v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 27 F. Supp. 938 (E. D. Pa.,
1939). But cf. Chemo-Mechanical Water Improvement Co. v. Milwaukee,
29 F. Supp. 45 (E. D. Wis., 1939).7
6 Laverett v. Continental Briar Pipe Co., 25 F. Supp. 80 (E. D. N. Y.,
1938).
'1 4. g., Newcomb v. Universal Match Co., 25 F. Supp. 169 (P. D. N. Y.,
1938) ; Nichols v. Sanborn Co., 24 F. Supp. 908 (D. Mass., 1938); McIner-
ney v. William P. MacDonald Constr. Co., 28 F. Supp. 557 (E. D. N. Y.,
1939); Dixon v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 27 F. Supp. 797 (W. D. La., 1939) ;
Christiansen v. Steamtug "Bern", 35 F. Supp. 522 (E. D. N. Y., 1940);
Contra, but probably erroneous: Poppino v. Jones Store Co., 1 F. R. D.
215 (W. D. Mo., 1940).
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eminent relied to show knowledge on the part of de-
fendant's officers.7"
Perhaps the greatest amount of discussion under the
Federal rules has arisen over the question whether a party
may by discovery inquire into evidence which his oppo-
nent, or his opponent's insurer, has gathered in prepara-
tion for trial. The question generally comes up in personal
injury cases. After the accident, the putative defendant
or his insurer generally interviews witnesses and takes
their statements, and if a corporation is involved there may
be reports to superior officers. May plaintiff obtain in-
spection of these statements either by motion for produc-
tion of documents or by taking the deposition of the party
or the investigator? 79
A few early decisions indicated that such discovery
would be allowed."' In one of the cases, however, plaintiff
was attempting to inspect her own statement which de-
fendant's insurer had taken,8 and in another the state-
ments were made by plaintiff, her daughter, her son-in-law,
and her physician.8 2 One decision did permit a plaintiff
to inquire into statements obtained by his opponent's in-
surer from other witnesses.8 3 Later cases, however, have
pretty generally denied such discovery either under the
deposition rules or under the rule as to production of docu-
ments, 4 either on the ground that the matter is privileged,
"United States v. American Solvents & Chemical Co. of Calif., 30 F.
Supp. 107 (D. Del., 1939).
79See generally Commentary, Discovery of Statements and, Documents
Obtained after Claim Has Accrued, 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 26b.211 (1940);
Pike and Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation (1940) 7 U. Chi. L. Rev.
297, 301 et 8eq.
80 Bough v. Lee, 26 F. Supp. 1000, 28 F. Supp. 673, 29 F. Supp. 498 (S. D.
N. Y., 1939) ; Kulich v. Murray, 28 F. Supp. 675 (S. D. N. Y., 1939) ; Price
v. Levitt, 29 F. Supp. 164 (E. D. N. Y., 1939).
"I Bough v. Lee, 26 F. Supp. 1000, 28 F. Supp. 673, 29 F. Supp. 498 (S. D.
N. Y., 1939).
82 Price v. Levitt, 29 F. Supp. 164 (E. D. N. Y., 1939).
Kulich v. Murray, 28 F. Supp. 675 (S. D. N. Y., 1939).
McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585 (E. D. N. Y., 1939) ; Creden v.
Central R. Co., 1 F. R. D. 168 (E. D. N. Y., 1940); Slydell v. Capital
Transit Co., 1 F. R. D. 15 (D. C., 1939) ; Seals v. Capital Transit Co., I
F. R. D. 133 (D. C., 1939); Floridin Co. v. Attapulgus Clay Co., 26 F.
Supp. 968 (D. Del, 1939) ; Kenealy v. Texas Co., 29 F. Supp. 502 (S. D.
N. Y., 1939); Fluxgold v. United States Lines Co., 29 F. Supp. 506 (S. D.
N. Y., 1939); Bennett v. Waterman S. S. Co., 29 F. Supp. 506 (S. D. N. Y.,
1939) ; Rose Silk Mills v. Insurance Co. of North America, 29 F. Supp. 504
(S. D. N. Y., 1939; Gitto v. "Italia", 31 r. Supp. 567 (E. D. N. Y., 1940) ;
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or on the broad ground that to permit a party to make use
of his opponent's preparation for trial "would penalize the
diligent and place a premium on laziness"." In addition,
some cases have denied discovery on the ground that the
statements would be hearsay and inadmissible in evi-
dence. 6 •
It may be questioned whether such matters can prop-
erly be considered as privileged. 7 Nor should the objec-
tion that the statements are hearsay be given weight.8
But the courts are apparently set against allowing such
discovery, and the rulings can be justified on the ground
that to permit it would be "oppressive". It seems likely
that the Maryland courts will follow the rule laid down
by the majority of the Federal decisions, particularly in
the light of the precedent furnished by a decision on the
point by Judge Chesnut."9
Related to the problem just discussed is the question
whether a party may examine by deposition an expert wit-
ness whom his adversary has engaged and whose only
knowledge of the matters in issue comes from the fact of
such employment 0 The question has come up in two
cases, in both of which the examination was denied. In
Schweinert v. Insurance Co. of North America, 1 F. R. D. 247 (S. D. N. Y.,
1940); Olson v. New York Central R. Co., 31 F. Supp. 745 (E. D. N. Y.,
1940); Maryland, for use of Montvila, v. Pan-American Bus Lines, Inc.,
1 F. R. D. 213 (D. Md., 1940) ; Byers Theatres, Inc., v. Murphy, 1 F. R. D.
286 (W. D. Va., 1940); Poppino v. Jones Store Co., 1 F. R. D. 215 (W. D.
Mo., 1940) ; Caraballo v. Export Steamship Corp., 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 34.411,
Case 2 (S. D. N. Y., 1940); French v.'Zalstem-Zalessky, 1 F. R. D. 508
(S. D. N. Y., 1940); Stern v. Exposition Greyhound, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 696
(E. D. N. Y., 1941); Piorkowski v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 1 F. R. D. 386
(M. D. Pa., 1940); Courteau v. Interlake Steamship Co., 1 F. R. D. 525
(W. D. Mich., 1941).
11 McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585 (E. D. N. Y., 1939).
Se As to this point see infra, circa n. 98 et seq.
87 See Commentary, Discovery of Statements and Documents Obtained
After Claim Has Accrued, 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 26b.211 (1940); Pike and
Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation (1940) 7 U. Chi. L. Rev. 297, 305-6.
An insurance company is not exempt from examination: Seligson v. Camp
Westover, Inc., 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 26b.211, Case 2 (S. D. N. Y., 1941). A
document not otherwise privileged does not become so through being
turned over to an attorney: Kane v. News Syndicate, Inc., 4 Fed. Rules
Serv. 34.42, Case 2 (S. D. N. Y., 1941).
88 See infra, circa n. 98 et seq.
9 Maryland, for use of Montvila, V. Pan-American Bus Lines, Inc., 1
F. R. D. 213 (D. Md., 1940).
See Commentary, Right to Take Deposition, of Eopert Engaged by
Adverse Party, 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 26b.411 (1941).
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the first case the witness was an engineer who had been
engaged to examine and test an allegedly defective cyl-
inder. The court held that any information which he had
acquired was privileged.91 In the second case the expert
was a physician who had been employed to give an expert
opinion, and who had not treated the decedent. The court
as a matter of discretion refused to allow examination.2
2. Discovery of matters within party's knowledge.
In many jurisdictions-including the Federal courts
before the new rules-the limitation has been followed
that discovery is not proper as to matters within the
knowledge of the discoveror or as to which he might obtain
information elsewhere.93 There is, of course, no particular
justification for such a rule. Knowing a fact is one thing;
proving it is another. If it is clearly recognized that the
obtaining of admissions is a legitimate object of discovery
practice, the arbitrary character of the old rule becomes
apparent.
The Federal rules are silent on this point, and the result
has been confusion and conflict. 94 The new Maryland rule,
however, expressly provides for discovery "whether or not
any of such matters is already known to or otherwise ob-
tainable by the party examining or submitting interroga-
tories"." While the rule in terms applies only to deposi-
tions and interrogatories, there is no reason to think that it
will not be equally applicable to discovery of documents96
and to the request for admissions.97
01 Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W. D.
Pa., 1940). For previous opinion to contrary see 31 F. Supp. 617 (W. D.
Pa., 1940).
"Boynton v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass.,
1941).
"BE. g., Keith v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 75 F. (2d) 249 (C. C. A. 2d,
1935). See Pike and Willis, The New Federal Depo8itiot-Di8covery Pro-
cedure (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1436, 1439.
" The cases are collected in Pike and Willis, Federal Di~covery in Opera-
tion (1940) 7 U. Chi. L. Rev. 297, 307-309.
8"Discovery Rule 3(4).96Bruun v. Hanson, 30 F. Supp. 602 (D. Idaho, 1939). But cf. Com-
pagnie Continentale d'Importatlon v. Pacific Argentine Brazil Line, Inc.,
1 F. R. D. 388 (S. D. N. Y., 1940).
'
7 1lanauer v. Siegel, 29 F. Supp. 329 (N. D. Ill., 1939).
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3. Discovery of matters inadmissible in evidence.
In the taking of depositions, particularly for the pur-
pose of discovery, much inadmissible matter finds its way
into the record. Usually no objection is made.8 Where
there is objection, however, conflict has arisen as to
whether or not discovery should be limited to matters ad-
missible in evidence.
On purely a priori reasoning there should be no reason
to apply to discovery the exclusionary rules of evidence.
The rules against hearsay, opinion, etc., are based on the
supposed lack of probative value of such evidence. But
these considerations are obviously inapplicable when the
information is sought, not necessarily for use as evidence,
but as a "lead" to further evidence, as a method of elimi-
nating issues at the trial, etc. If the deposition is offered
at the trial objection can then be made to the admissibility
of any particular answers, and in the meanwhile no harm
has come to the parties through disclosure of the informa-
tion.99
The Federal and Maryland rules seem to contemplate
inquiry into matters not strictly admissible in evidence.
Deposition Rule 1 (Federal Rule 26[a]) provides that
depositions may be taken "for the purpose of discovery or
for use as evidence in the proceeding or for both pur-
poses". And Deposition Rule 3 (Federal Rule 26[b]) per-
mits inquiry into "any matter, not privileged, which is rele-
vant to the subject matter involved in the pending pro-
ceeding".
The decisions under the Federal rules are not in accord
on this question. Some, taking the view just outlined,
have held that discovery should not be limited by the rules
of evidence."' The best statement of this position was
sRAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932) 150.
Pike and Willis, Federal Di8covery in Operation (1940) 7 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 297, 309-314; Note (1941) 50 Yale L. J. 708. For a contrary position
see Note (1940) 29 Geo. L. J. 382.
2o Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Co., 27 F. Supp. 946 (D. Conn.,
1939) ; Pirnie v. Andrews, 1 F. R. D. 252 (S. D. N. Y., 1939) ; Sears Roe-
buck & Co. v. Harrison, 1 F. R. D. 135 (N. D. Ill., 1940) ; Mackerer v. New
York Central R. Co., 1 F. R. D. 408 (E. D. N. Y., 1940) ; Byers Theaters,
Inc., v. Murphy, 1 F. R. D. 286 (W. D. Va., 1940) ; Vassardakis v. Parish,
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made by Judge Hincks in Lewis v. United Air Lines Trans-
port Co.,101 in which he said that "To the extent that the
examination develops useful information, it functions suc-
cessfully as an instrument of discovery, even if it produces
no testimony directly admissible". Other courts, however,
have applied evidentiary limitations to discovery, 10 2 gen-
erally without much consideration of the question. The
one case taking this position which has treated the prob-
lem at any length relied upon a strained construction of
"relevant" in Rule 26(b) (Discovery Rule 3) as meaning
"material and competent under the rules of evidence".'
A decision by Judge Chesnut has indicated that hearsay
statements may not be inquired into on the taking of a
deposition; 0 4 but the case involved discovery of an oppo-
nent's trial-preparation, 0 5 and the "hearsay" argument was
only an alternative reason for forbidding the inquiry.
Most of the decisions on the point concern either hear-
say or opinion evidence. Particularly in patent cases, the
rule has developed that interrogatories directed to matters
of opinion are improper.10 A few cases, however, have
taken a more realistic view. As was said in Schwartz v.
4 Fed. Rules Serv. 26b.5, Case 1 (S. D. N. Y., 1941) ; Steingut v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 26b.5, Case 2 (S. D. N. Y., 1941); Fox. v.
Fisher, 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 33.34, Case 1 (E. D. Tenn., 1941).
10. 27 F. Supp. 946 (D. Conn., 1939).
1I Fletcher v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 744 (E. D. N. Y.,
1939) ; Rose Silk Mills, Inc., v. Insurance Co. of North America, 29 F.
Supp. 504 (S. D. N. Y., 1939) ; Poppino v. Jones Store Co., 1 F. R. D. 215(W. D. Mo., 1940) ; Gitto v. "Italia", 31 F. Supp. 567 (E. D. N. Y., 1940) ;
Maryland, for use of Montvila, v. Pan-American Bus Lines, Inc., 1 F. R. D.
213 (D. Md., 1940) ; Barwick v. Powell, 1 F. R. D. 604 (S. D. N. Y., 1941).
See also note 106, infra.
100 Poppino v. Jones Store Co., 1 F. R. D. 215 (W. D.. Mo., 1940).
104 Maryland, for use of Montvila, v. Pan-American Bus Lines, Inc., 1
F. R. D. 213 (D. Md., 1940).
105 See supra, n. 89.
100 Stanley Works v. C. S. Mersick & Co., 1 F. R. D. 43 (D. Conn., 1939)
Boysell Co. v. Colonial Coverlet Co., 29 F. Supp. 122 (E. D. Tenn., 1939);
Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 25 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del.,
1938) Teller v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 27 F. Supp. 938 (E. D. Pa.,
1939) Lanova Corp. v. National Supply Co., 29 F. Supp. 119 (W. D. Pa.,
1939); Nakken Patents Corp. v. Rabinowitz, 1 F. R. D. 90 (E. D. N. Y.,
1940) Chandler v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 453 (E. D. Wis.,
1940) Chemical Foundation, Inc., v. Universal-Cyclops Steel Corp., 1
F. R. D. 533 (W. D. Pa., 1941) (patent cases). See also Tudor v. Leslie,
4 Fed. Rules Serv. 33.324, Case 1 (D. Mass., 1940) ; Doucette v. Howe, 1
F. R. D. 18 (D. Mass., 1939) (negligence cases).
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Howard Hosiery Co. 07 in overruling an objection that an
interrogatory called for an opinion:
"One of the purposes of Rule 33 [Discovery Rule 2]
is to obtain admissions and thus limit the subjects of
controversy at the trial and avoid unnecessary testi-
mony and waste of time in preparation . . .The plain-
tiff's objection to answering this interrogatory seems
to me to be the last word in technicality and entirely
out of touch with the spirit of the new rules."
This attitude seems the correct one. The question should
not be: Does the interrogatory call for opinion?, but: Will
an answer in any way expedite the course of the litiga-
tion? It is to be hoped that the Maryland courts will adopt
this more reasonable interpretation. Fortunately they are
not hampered, as were the Federal courts,' by any body
of precedent against inquiry into matters of opinion.
If matters of opinion can be gone into on interroga-
tories, of course they may also be made the subject of a
request to admit. The rule itself refers to "relevant mat-
ters of fact", but if an admission will facilitate trial it
should matter little that it may technically amount to an
expression of opinion.10 9
Whether inadmissible matters may be inquired into on
a motion for production of documents is another matter.
The same considerations of policy would seem to apply
here as in the case of depositions or interrogatories; and it
has been contended that the rules should be construed
alike.1 0 Yet the difference in language of the rules may
require a different conclusion. The rule on depositions and
interrogatories requires only a showing of "relevancy";
but documents must "constitute or contain evidence mate-
10727 F. Supp. 443 (E. D. Pa., 1939). See also Pierce v. Submarine
Signal Co., 25 F. Supp. 862 (D. Mass., 1939) ; McInerney v. Win. P. Mac-
Donald Constr. Co., 28 F. Supp. 557 (E. D. N. Y., 1939).
10' See Batdorf v. Sattley Coin Handling Mach. Co., 238 Fed. 925 (E. D.
Mich., 1916) ; Gennert v. Burke & James, 231 Fed. 998 (S. D. N. Y., 1916) ;
Earp Thomas Farmogerm Co. v. Stimuplant Laboratories, Inc., 38 F. (2d)
691 (E. D. N. Y., 1930).
109 Walsh v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 566 (E. D.
N. Y., 1939).
110 Note (1941) 50 Yale L. J. 708; Connecticut Importing Co. v. Con-
tinental Distilling Corp., 1 F. R. D. 190 (D. Conn., 1940).
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rial to any matter involved in the proceeding".11' His-
torically, discovery of documents seems to have been lim-
ited to documents admissible in evidence;112 and a com-
parison of the different drafts of Federal Rule 34 indicates
that the Advisory Committee considered a broader scope
but decided against it."' At any rate, the majority of the
Federal courts have limited discovery of documents to
those admissible in evidence, 1 4 and it is probable that
Maryland judges will follow their lead.
4. Relevancy.
Whether or not information sought by discovery must
be admissible in evidence, certainly it must be relevant.
Relevancy, of course, is a nebulous concept: at the trial it
may mean one thing; before trial, another. It is not easy
to tell, while a case is still in its preliminary stages,
whether or not particular evidence will prove to be rele-
vant at the trial. Accordingly the Federal courts have
generally held that the idea of relevancy should be given a
broad interpretation, and that inquiry will not be limited
"unless the information sought upon the examination is
clearly privileged or irrelevant"; 11 all that need be shown
is that it is reasonably probable that the evidence sought
will be material or relevant.""
One of the best-reasoned opinions on the question of
relevancy under the Federal Rules is Fox v. House."7 The
action was for an accounting, and plaintiff sought to obtain
discovery as to the items of the account. Defendant ob-
111 Federal Rule 34, Maryland Discovery Rule 4.People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N. Y. 24, 156 N. E. 84
(1927).
"I3 See Commentary, Discovery of Documents Not Admissible in Evidence,
4 Fed. Rules Serv. 34.412 (1941).
I" Poppino v. Jones Store Co., 1 F. R. D. 215 (W. D. Mo., 1940) ; United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1 F. R. D. 62 (S. D. N. Y., 1939) ;
Kenealy v. Texas Co., 29 F. Supp. 502 (S. D. N. Y., 1939) ; Barwick v.
Powell, 1 F. R. D. 604 (S. D. N. Y., 1941); but see Mackerer v. New York
Central R. Co., 1 F. R. D. 408 (E. D. N. Y., 1940) ; Connecticut Importing
Co., v. Continental Distilling Corp., 1 F. R. D. 190 (D. Conn., 1940).
115 Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Burger, 27 F. Supp. 556 (S. D. N. Y.,
1939).
111 Quemos Theatres, Inc., v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949
(D. N. J., 1940); Beler v. Savarona Ship Corp., 26 F. Supp. 599 (E. D.
N. Y., 1940) ; Stevenson v. Melady, 1 F. R. D. 329 (S. D. N. Y., 1940).
1729 F. Supp. 673 (E. D. Okla., 1939).
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jected that the right to the accounting had first to be deter-
mined. The court overruled the objection, saying that the
rules were intended to facilitate preparation on all phases
of the case, that piecemeal discovery would block a speedy
determination of the litigation, and that plaintiff should be
permitted to ascertain if an accounting would be worth
the trouble of obtaining it. Some cases have taken a nar-
rower view on the question of discovery as to damages,
holding that damages may not be inquired into until lia-
bility is established."1 This view, however, is out of line
with the theory of the new procedure. Disclosure will not
hurt the party; it may expedite settlement. And it can
hardly be contended that the matter is not "relevant".
5. Names of witnesses.
In most jurisdictions the rule has prevailed that a party
might not compel his adversary to disclose the names of
his witnesses, for fear of tampering and subornation."9
More enlightened students of the problem, however, have
realized that "witnesses do not belong to one party more
than to another",'120 and that the dangers of perjury were
probably not as serious as the disadvantages involved in
denying the parties equal access to the sources of relevant
information. The Federal rules accordingly permit inquiry
as to "the identity and location of persons having knowl-
edge of relevant facts," a provision carried over into Mary-
land Discovery Rule 3.
The rule, of course, does not require a party to furnish
his opponent with a list of his prospective witnesses, and a
request to "state the names and addresses of your wit-
"' Boysell Co. v. Colonial Coverlet Co., 29 F. Supp. 122 (E. D. Tenn.,
1939); Looper v. Colonial Coverlet Co., 29 F. Supp. 125 (E. D. Tenn.,
1939); Unlandherm v. Park Contracting Co., 26 F. Supp. 743 (S. D. N. Y.,
1939); O'Rourke v. RKO Radio Pictures, 27 F. Supp. 996 (D. Mass., 1939).
Contra: Berke v. United Paperboard Co., 26 F. Supp. 412 (S. D. N. Y.,
1938) ; American Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Exermont, 1 F. R. D. 574 (S. D. N. Y.,
1904).
11 Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure
(1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1436, 1442; Commentary, Discovery of Names of
Witnesses, 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 26b.22 (1940).
.. Per Taft, J., in Shaw v. Ohio 12dison Co., 9 Ohio Dec. 809, 812 (Super.
Ct., 1887).
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nesses" would probably not do."' Some decisions, how-
ever, have allowed interrogatories asking for the names
and addresses of "all persons having knowledge" of facts
relevant to particular issues.122 The more particular the
request, the better reception it will probably get from the
court in case of objection. Thus, for example, a request for
names and addresses of all eye-witnesses of an accident
would probable be held proper.121
One case has held that a deponent could not be required
to divulge names of witnesses where he knew them only
by hearsay. 24 This, however, seems clearly wrong. The
hearsay rule has nothing to do with the matter; the pur-
pose of the inquiry is to locate persons with first-hand
knowledge of the facts and it should make no difference
how their identity came to be known to the interrogated
party. Under the Maryland rule this is made especially
clear by the reference to any such information, "however
obtained".
Although names of witnesses may ordinarily be ob-
tained, the court has power to forbid the inquiry if justice
requires it. Thus in one case a plaintiff in an action on a
fire insurance policy sought disclosure of the names of de-
fendant's witnesses. The court refused to order the dis-
covery after the district attorney had stated that he in-
tended to prosecute plaintiff for arson and that disclosure
of the evidence would enable plaintiff to frame an alibi. 125
6. Limitation of scope of examination.
In allowing such wide scope of discovery by deposition
the draftsmen of the Federal rules of course realized that
121 See Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixie-Cola Laboratories, 30 F. Supp. 275 (D. Md.,
1939) ; Remarks of Prof. Wm. W. Dawson, Proceedings of Washington
Institute on Federal Rules (1938) 107, 108.
1 Unlandherm v. Park Contracting Corp., 26 F. Supp. 743 (S. D. N. Y.,
1938); cf. Penn v. Automobile Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 336 (D. Ore., 1939).
But of. Barter v. Eastern Steamship Lines, 1 F. R. D. 65 (S. D. N. Y.,
1939).
128 See Creden v. Central R. Co., 1 F. R. D. 168 (E. D. N. Y., 1939)
Maryland v. Pan-American Bus Lines, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 213 (D. Md., 1940).
Cf. F. & M. Skirt Co. v. A. Wimpfheimer & Bro., 25 F. Supp. 898 (D. Mass.,
1939).
12 Poppino v. Jones Store Co., 1 F. R. D. 215 (W. D. Mo., 1940). But cf.
Maryland, for use of Montvila, v. Pan-American Bus Lines, Inc., 1 F. R. D.
213 (D. Md., 1940).
15Penn v. Automobile Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 336 (D. Ore., 1939).
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abuses might be possible. Rather than attempt to impose
limitations on the rules. themselves, however, they wisely
left the matter to the discretion of the court in which the
action is being tried. Thus Federal rules 30 (b) and (d) and
31(d) permit the court, among other things,126 to forbid
the taking of a deposition, or to preclude inquiry into cer-
tain matters, or to limit the scope of examination to par-
ticular matters, and particularly to provide that secret
processes, developments, or research need not be disclosed.
These powers have been granted to the Maryland courts
by Deposition Rule 6 (a).
It was recognized in one of the first decisions under
the Federal rules that these provisions were not intended
to be made the basis of an application to the court in every
case."' And subsequent decisions have shown a strong
disinclination to limit the scope of examination in advance
of the taking of a deposition. Some definite prejudice or
unreasonable oppression must be shown.'2s In particular,
the courts will not attempt to pass on questions of rele-
vancy or privilege in advance of the examination, but
rather will tell the party or witness to wait until the ques-
tions are asked and then raise the objection if he cares
to.
129
These decisions are of course entirely applicable under
the Maryland rules. To make doubly sure that the protec-
tive provisions of the rules were not used to defeat the
liberal provisions for scope of discovery the draftsmen
included a caveat that "The policy of these rules is to re-
quire full disclosure as specified in Discovery Rule 3 and
the powers conferred by section (a) of this rule shall be
used only to prevent genuine oppression or abuse".
120 See 8upra, circa notes 67-69.
127 Laverett v. Continental Briar Pipe Co., 25 F. Supp. 80 (E. D. N. Y.,
1938).
18 Application of Zenith Radio Corp., 1 F. R. D. 627 (E. D. Pa., 1941);
Stankiewicz v. Pillsbury Flour Mills Co., 26 F. Supp. 1003 (S. D. N. Y.,
1939) ; Goldberg v. Raleigh Mfrs., 28 F. Supp. 975 (D. Mass., 1939).
2
9 Krier v. Muschel, 29 F. Supp. 482 (S. D. N. Y., 1939) ; Union Central
Life Ins. Co. v. Burger, 27 F. Supp. 556 (S. D. N. Y., 1939); Lewis v.
United Air Lines Transport Corp., 27 F. Supp. 946 (D. Conn., 1939);
Gitto v. "Italia", 31 F. Supp. 567 (E. D. N. Y., 1940) ; French v. Zalstem-
Zalessky, 1 F. R. D. 240 (S. D. N. Y., 1940) ; Brockway Glass Co., Inc., v.
Hartford-Empire Co., 36 F. Supp. 470 (W. D. N. Y., 1941).
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It is apparent from what we have said above that there
is practically nothing in the new Maryland Rules which
has not been tried and found satisfactory in other juris-
dictions. Such novel provisions as are included have for
the most part been devised in an effort to avoid specific
difficulties which have developed in the practical opera-
tion of comparable provisions of the Federal Rules or of
state statutes. The most striking features of the new Rules
-extension of discovery by deposition to all witnesses,
whether parties or not, and liberalization of the scope of
inquiry-have behind them a record of successful opera-
tion in many states as well as in the Federal courts.
Within the excellent framework which the new Rules
supply, Maryland may well develop as effective a system
of pre-trial discovery as has ever been known. The ulti-
mate success of the new procedure, however, depends on
the attitude of the bar and of the judiciary. The Rules
are not self-executing; they must be applied by lawyers
and judges, and a cooperative and liberal attitude on the
part of the bar in utilizing the rules, and of the bench in
enforcing them, will do much to insure a smooth transi-
tion from the old ways to the new.
The matter of expense, for instance, is one in which a
cooperative attitude may mean all the difference between
success and failure. For it cannot be denied that, while
the oral deposition is the most effective method of discov-
ery, it is also as a general matter the most expensive, and
in small cases the interests at stake may not justify the
cost. Much, however, can be done toward reduction of
costs through the taking of depositions informally by agree-
ment, as permitted by Deposition Rule 4, and by use of
the attorneys' own stenographers to write up the evi-
dence.13 ° In addition, under Deposition Rule 8 (c) which,
as pointed out above, is original with the Maryland pro-
cedure,' the court can accomplish the same thing for
poorer litigants and should exercise its discretion under
that section freely for that purpose. And of course the
1s See RAGLAND, DiscovERY (1932) 172.
1 Supra, n. 21.
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same broad scope of examination is available for methods
the costs of which are inconsequential-written deposi-
tions, written interrogatories, and the notice to admit.
It is also important that the system be kept simple and
non-technical by reducing to a minimum dilatory and time-
consuming motions. While the Maryland Rules have taken
a step beyond the Federal Rules by allowing all depositions
to be taken on notice without motion even before answer'82
and by definitely eliminating motions directed against a
request to admit,133 there still remain motions for discovery
of documents or other things, motions for physical or
mental examination, motions to compel answers on the
taking of a deposition, motions for protective orders, mo-
tions to enlarge or shorten time, motions for leave to serve
more than thirty interrogatories, exceptions to answers
to interrogatories, motions to impose penalties-each of
which will be a separate motion. But by adopting a clear
and liberal policy from the very beginning, the courts can
relieve themselves of the burden of passing on unnecessary
motions and can likewise save the time of lawyers. They
can do this by refusing to entertain unwarranted motions
to prevent the taking of depositions and by dealing severely
with refusals to answer and by imposing expenses on
lawyers and parties in appropriate cases. If the courts
in this manner make clear their policy to permit discovery
in all normal circumstances, most of these questions will
be handled by the lawyers themselves without application
to the court. In more complicated cases the courts might
find it wise to hold "pre-discovery" conferences, such as
have been suggested for the Federal courts,' for the pur-
pose of narrowing the issues, securing stipulations, etc., in
order to limit the extent of necessary trial-preparation and
eliminate waste action.
132 See supra, n. 19.
183 See 8upra, n. 55.
134 See Holtzoff, Pretrial Procedure (1941) 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 1015, 1017,
1 F. R. D. 759, 763-4; Fairwater Transportation Co. v. Chris-Craft Corp.,
1 F. R. D. 509 (S. D. N. Y., 1940).
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COMPARATIVE TABLE OF MARYLAND AND
FEDERAL RuLEs
Maryland
Deposition
Rule
1
3
4
5(a)
5(b)
6(a)
7(a)
7(b)
8(a)
8(b)
8(c)
8(d)
9(a)
9(b)
10
11(a)
11(b)
11(c)
12(a)
12(b)
12(c)
12(d)
Maryland
Discovery
Rule
2(a), (b), (c)
2(d)
3
4
5
6(a), (b), (c)
6(d)
7
Comparable
Federal
Rule
26(a)
28
29
30(a)
31(a)
30(b)
45(d) (1)
45(d) (2)
26(c),30(c)
31(b)
30(c)
37(a)
30(e)
30(f)
32
26(d)
26(e)
26(f)
37(b) (1)
37(b) (2)
30(g) (1)
30(g) (2)
33
37(d)
26(b)
34
35
36
37(c)
37(b) (2)
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